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This study is concerned with the use of multiple 
sources of subject uncertainty in a set of coalition 
formation experiments. The purpose of the study is to 
provide a research methodology that will better general-
ize to coalition behavior found outside the laboratory. 
Three models are offered to explain the study's results. 
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Coalitions play an important role in social interac-
tions. Whether the situation is a business meeting, polit-
ical convention, or simply a social gathering, coalitions 
are formed to meet the needs of people. Basically, a coa-
lition represents the combining of two or more individuals' 
resources in an effort to secure some mutually desirable 
goal. 
One goal of a coalition may be self-protection. By 
uniting resources, members of a coalition might be able to 
prevent the harm or exploitation of its individual members 
by a hostile force. Civil rights groups and the early la-
bor unions serve as examples of self-protection coalitions. 
A second goal a coalition could serve is that of 
competition. Through a coalition, it could become possi-
ble to gain a desired outcome in the face of competition 
from an opponent who could defeat the coalition members 
individually. An example of a competitive coalition is 
that of two countries forming a military alliance against 
a powerful third country in order to possess some "neu-
tral territory." 
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A third goal of coalitions is that of preserving 
status quo. Status quo coalitions serve to prevent unde-
sirable changes from occurring to some situation common 
to its members. White home-owner groups which have op-
posed the racial integration of their neighborhoods are 
an example of a status quo coalition. 
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Whatever the purpose of a coalition, its potential 
members may consider four criteria before deciding whether 
or not to join the coalition. One major criterion is esti-
mated probability of obtaining the desired outcome indi-
vidually. If a person believes he or she is capable of 
acquiring an outcome without assistance, then that person 
is not likely to join a coalition. 
Even if a person believes he or she is capable of in-
dividual success, a second criterion to take into account 
is the ability to overcome the opposing efforts of a coa-
lition. The person able to achieve success in some out-
come even in competition with a coalition is not likely to 
be motivated to join a coalition. Thus, the first two 
questions the prospective coalition members asks is, "Can 
I accomplish what I seek without assistance?" (related to 
criterion 1), and, "Can I accomplish what I seek in the 
face of opposition from a coalition?" (related to crite-
rion 2). If the answer to either of these questions is 
"No," then there should exist some motivation to join a 
coalition. 
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A third criterion is the effect of the coalition's 
influence on outcomes. In terms of influencing some out-
come, coalitions function in either a deterministic or 
probabilistic fashion. A deterministic coalition assures 
its members of success. The probability of obtaining the 
desired outcome for a deterministic coalition equals one. 
The probabilistic coalition is formed to increase the 
chances of its members to obtain a desired outcome over 
that of the members' solitary efforts. The chance of a 
probabilistic coalition's success is always less than one. 
The fourth criterion involves the obtained outcome 
or payoff the individual expects to receive for his or her 
participation in a coalition. The more profitable an in-
dividual believes the payoff will be, the more likely that 
person is to enter into a coalition. 
The second two relevant questions asked in this re-
gard by the prospective coalition member are: "How likely 
is the potential coalition to succeed in its goal?" (rela-
ted to criterion 3) , and, "How will the outcome (payoff) 
be distributed?" (related to criterion 4). Notice that 
answers to the first two questions (from criterias 1 and 
2) determine whether a person seeks to join a coalition 
or pursue his or her goal alone. Answers to the second 
two questions indicate to the prospective coalition mem-
ber a preferable coalition partner. Though people may not 
always use the set of four criteria discussed here, they 
are presumed to follow some deliberate decision process 
when faced with the opportunity to form a coalition. 
Social psychologists have long been interested in 
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the dynamics of coalition formation. Two questions com-
monly addressed by social psychologists have been: "What 
decision criteria do people use in forming coalitions?" 
and, "How do coalition members determine the terms of pay-
off distribution in the event of successfully obtaining 
their goal?" In the following section, the coalition 
formation theories most relevant to the present study are 
presented. The articles reviewed consist of the major 
social psychological theories on coalition formation. 
After the literature review, a critique of the current 
coalition formation research methodology used to test the 
discussed theories has been presented. 
CHAPTER II 
RELEVANT COALITION FORMATION LITERATURE 
A variable commonly studied in coalition research 
has been the distribution of resources among members of a 
triad. The resources of triad members have frequently 
been identified by the letters A, B, and C. Those letters 
served to identify resources used by the triad members to 
acquire the desired outcome. For basic coalition forma-
tion, decision criteria, and coalition predictions have 
usually been studied for the A > B > C, A < (B + C) re-
source situation. The reasons for focusing on this par-
ticular situation in the present study are twofold. 
First, it is with this situation that theories show the 
greatest divergence in their predictions about coalitions. 
Second, the majority of coalition formation research (the 
present study included) has used the A > B > C, A < (B + C) 
resource distribution situation. 
Caplow's Models 
The work of Caplow (1956) has been recognized for 
presenting the first social psychological theory of coali-
tion formation. Caplow's 1956 theory presented the vari-
able of interpersonal control as the major determinant of 
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coalition behavior. Under this model, individuals decide 
to form a coalition on the basis of the amount of control 
each would have over other members in the triad. Indi-
viduals were said to prefer a coalition which maximized 
their control over other triad members while it minimized 
the amount of control exercised over them. 
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Caplow (1956) predicted that in a resource situation 
where A > B > C, A < (B + C), the coalitions of AC and BC 
had an equal probability of occurring. Caplow predicted 
that the person weakest in resources would be sought after 
as the preferred coalition partner by other members of the 
triad. A coalition between individuals B and C represented 
a revolutionary coalition. The revolutionary coalition was 
so named because it enabled the two weaker members of a 
triad to "overthrow" the strongest individual. If under 
the same resource distribution, a coalition formed between 
individuals A and B the coalition was identified as con-
servative. According to Caplow, an A and B coalition re-
tained the initial power hierarchy. Within the coalition, 
individual A continued to "dominate" individual B, and the 
excluded individual C remained the weakest person in the 
triad. While a coalition between individuals A and C was 
acknowledged by Caplow, it was not classified in his theo-
retical work. The final determination of which coalition 
would be formed, according to Caplow, depended on the 
inducements the stronger A or B each offered C. 
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Given Caplow's (1956) assumption that triad members 
were solely motivated by the opportunity for interpersonal 
control, A and B prefer a coalition with C because it would 
enable either one of them to control the other members of 
the triad. A or B could control C by right of their indi-
vidually superior resources, while the triad member ex-
eluded from the coalition would be controlled through the 
combined strength of the coalition. Without additional in-
ducements, C would have no preference for either A or B. 
In either the AC or BC coalition, C would control the ex-
eluded triad member and be controlled by the coalition 
partner. 
In 1959, Caplow expanded his coalition model to take 
into account situational variables on coalition formation 
strategies. Caplow introduced three situational coalition 
strategies which were defined as follows: 
Continuous: Here the object of a coalition is 
to control the joint activity of the triad and 
to secure control over awards which are found 
within the situation itself. 
Episodic: The membership of the triad is stable, 
and the contest for power continues over an ex-
tended time, but the object of a coalition is 
to secure an advantage in the episodic distribu-
tion of rewards which occur periodically and 
under predetermined conditions. 
Terminal: The coalition is directed toward a 
single redistribution of power, terminal, 
either because it dissolves the triad or be-
cause it leads to a state of equilibrium which 
precludes further distribution (p. 489). 
The example of a continuous coalition situation would be 
the situation in which a group of three friends select 
their social activities through majority sentiment. A 
triad of professors involved in the acquisition and divi-
sion of research funding for their individual projects 
would be a situation providing motivation for episodic 
coalitions. Finally, a scenario in which the United 
States, Russia, and China engage in all-out nuclear war-
fare would illustrate an appropriate situation for the 
formation of a terminal coalition. 
In predicting coalitions based on the nature of the 
resource situation and situational strategy conditions, 
Caplow (1959) stated that for the resource situation 
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A > B > C, A < (B + C), overlapping coalition patterns 
occur in the Continuous and Episodic coalition situations. 
For Continuous coalition situations, coalitions between 
AC and BC are predicted the most likely to occur. In an 
Episodic coalition situation, all possible coalitions (AB, 
AC, and BC} have an equal probability of occurring. Cap-
low indicated interpersonal control was important only in 
Continuous coalition situations. Individuals in Episodic 
coalition situations concentrate on forming coalitions 
which maximize their share of the reward. For the termi-
nal situation, Caplow predicted that no coalition would 
form. 
Minimum Resource Theory 
Caplow's (1956, 1959) work has served as a background 
against which other social psychological coalition theories 
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were developed. One such theory that evolved from Caplow's 
models was the Minimum Resource Theory of Gamson (1961). 
The Minimum Resource Theory was designed to predict coali-
tions in groups where N ~ 3 and estimate the payoff distri-
bution among coalition members. 
The predictions which resulted from Minimum Resource 
Theory were based on two assumptions: First, the coalition 
containing the minimum amount of resources necessary to ob-
tain the payoff will be the most likely to form. Second, 
payoff distribution will be based on the parity concept. 
This means that members of a successful coalition expects 
a payoff proportional to the resources they contribute to 
the coalition. Thus individuals seek to identify and join 
the coalition which maximizes their resource contribution 
and expected payoff share, according to Minimum Resource 
Theory. For the A > B > C, A < (B + C) resource situation, 
Gamson (1961) predicted that coalitions would probably 
form between triad members B and C. Such a coalition con-
tains the minimum necessary resources used to obtain the 
payoff while maximizing each member's expected parity-
based payoff share. 
Bargaining Theory 
Komarita and Chertkoff (1973) designed the Bargain-
ing Theory of coalition behavior. Unlike the theories of 
Caplow or Gamson, Bargaining Theory considers the effect 
of successive experiences on coalition behavior. Related 
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research has found that payoff distribution between coali-
tion allies shifted or fluctuated over a series of experi-
mental coalition trials. The theory states that the 
stronger coalition member sought to distribute payoff 
according to parity; payoff share proportional to contri-
buted resources. The weaker coalition member is assumed 
to advocate a payoff distribution based on the concept of 
equality, with the payoff being divided evenly between the 
two coalition members. Bargaining theory holds that the 
distribution norm differences are resolved by two condi-
tions. First, coalition members negotiate from overlapping 
expected maximum and minimum acceptable payoff ranges. 
Second, the threat of a dissatisfied coalition ally leaving 
to form a new coalition provides motivation for coalition 
members to accommodate one another. Bargaining Theory 
states that, over successive coalition formation trials, 
individuals form coalitions and payoff agreements which 
minimize the probability of either coalition member "de-
fecting" or leaving to form a new coalition with the ex-
cluded triad member. 
A major assumption of the Bargaining Theory is that 
triad members attempt to form a coalition with another 
member whose expected range of payoff distribution most 
closely matches their own. In their discussion of the 
A > B > C, A < (B + C) resource situation, the authors 
predicted that the most likely coalition would consist of 
B-C. This prediction is based on the assumption that 
individuals B and C have the. least conflict in terms of 
their respective expected payoff shares. The next most 
likely coalition was predicted to form between individ-
uals A and C. The least likely coalition was predicted 
to be the A-B formation. 
Weighted Probability Model 
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Shortly after presentation of the Bargaining Theory, 
Komarita (1973) proposed the Weighted Probability model 
of coalition behavior. Komarita made four theoretical 
assumptions. First, minimum winning coalitions will form 
in the absence of incentives to maximize joint outcomes. 
Second, the difficulty of forming a coalition increases 
monotonically as a function of group size. Third, the 
expected reward for an individual in a coalition is pro-
portional to the probability of that person's being in-
cluded in a winning coalition. Fourth, if two or more 
coalitions have the same expected reward, an individual 
will attempt to form a coalition in which all members are 
relatively equal in resources (Komarita, 1973). 
The Weighted probability model does not directly con-
sider the A > B > C, A < (B + C) resource situation. The 
theory's emphasis is upon the e.ffects group size and quan-
tity of alternatives available to group members had on 
coalition behavior. Murnigham (1978) has reported three 
ways in which the Weighted probability model differs from 
other social psychology coalition formation theories. 
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First, the expected reward is said to be determined by the 
quantity and size of coalition alternatives, rather than 
by the quality of coalition choices. Second, the model is 
considered applicable to coalition situations in which the 
resources of participants are not specified. Third, the 
Weighted probability model is capable of making exact pre-
dictions for the probabilities of different coalition 
configurations. 
The predictions of the Weighted probability model were 
based on studies of tetradic and pentradic groups. Through 
coalitions formed in a triadic situation were not specif-
ically dealt with, the model's first assumption gave some 
indication of likely coalitions. Komarita's (1974) defin-
ition of a "Minimum winning coalition" as one in which 
deletion of any member would cause the loss of the payoff, 
the most likely coalition under the A > B > C, A < (B + C) 
resource situation would be B-C. 
Anticompetitive Model 
The "Anticompetitive" Theory discussed by Gamson 
(1964) originated from the studies of Bond and Vinacke 
(1961) and Uesugi and Vinacke (1963). The Anticompetitive 
Theory considers gender differences in the strategies for 
playing a mixed-motive coalition formation game. The con-
clusions reached from the articles are that males use 
an exploitive, competitive style of play, while female 
subjects seem more motivated to maintain good social 
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relations over maximizing their own individual playoffs. 
With its strong focus on sex differences in coalition be-
havior, the Anticompetitive Theory has little to say con-
cerning the influence of initial resource distribution on 
coalition formation. The authors of both studies did 
note that the initial coalitions formed consisted of the 
"weaker players" competing against the "stronger players." 
It was found when a cumulative score game situation 
was used that, as subjects' scores were summed over tri-
als, there was a strong tendency for the two players be-
hind the leading scorer to ally, regardless of their 
initial/resources. This finding received support from an 
earlier study conducted by Vinacke (1969) investigating 
the effect of cumulative scores on triadic coalition 
formation. Thus, the findings of Anticompetitive research 
give tentative support to the prediction of a BC coalition 
in an A > B > C, A < (B + C) resource situation. 
Expected Utility Model 
The Coalition Expected Utility Model (Wahba, 1972b) 
states that, when the success of a coalition is uncertain, 
individuals seek to form coalitions with the highest 
utility. Wahba (1972b) defines coalition success uncer-
tainty as a situation in which the probability of success 
for any given coalition is greater than zero and less 
than one. The expected utility is seen as a value re-
sulting from the subjective evaluation of the consequences 
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of a given coalition's success or failure. Coalition Ex-
pected Utility theory evaluates the A > B > C, A < (B + C) 
resource distribution situations under three conditions: 
First, it is assumed that the probability of success for 
any coalition is greater than zero and less than one. 
Second, the probability of coalition success is assumed to 
be positively related to coalition strength. Third, the 
utility of a coalition's success is assumed equal to one, 
while the utility of a coalition's failure is equal to 
zero. Under the stated conditions, the stronger the coa-
lition, the more likely is success in obtaining the pay-
off. Although not specifically stated, there is an 
indication that payoff distribution is assumed to be 
parity-based. Wahba predicts that for A > B > C, A < 
(B + C) resource situation, the AB coalition is the most 
likely to be formed. The least likely coalition to form 
is one between individuals B and C. Research involving 
the Coalition Expected Utility model has reported data 
indicating that, "Coalitions with higher probability of 
success and lower gains were preferred over coalitions 
with higher gains and lower probability of success" 
(Wahba, 1972b, p. 675). 
General Research Findings 
The majority of coalition research has reported re-
sults which indicate that the individual with the greatest 
amount of resources is excluded from winning coalitions 
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(e.g., Chertkoff, 1970; Chertkoff & Esser, 1977; Collins & 
Raven, 1969; Gamson, 1964; Komarita & Meek, 1978; Murnig-
han, 1978; Stryker, 1972). This paradoxical "strength is 
weakness" effect was labelled the "power inversion" ef-
fect by Cole (1969). The power inversion effect referred 
to the significant preference for the weakest triad member 
as a coalition partner by the other triad members. In 
terms of experimental results the power inversion effect 
was manifested in the formation of winning coalitions 
which included the weakest triad member and excluded the 
strongest triad member. Notice that out of the six coa-
lition theories presented earlier, only Wahba's (1972b) 
coalition, Expected Utility theory, specifically predicted 
that the weakest triad member would be excluded from "win-
ning" coalitions. 
CHAPTER III 
GENERAL CRITIQUE OF CURRENT 
COALITION RESEARCH 
Lack of External Validity 
Observations of coalitions formed in field or "real 
life" settings frequently consist of what has been termed 
"Conservative" coalitions by Caplow (1956). Thus, in 
"real life," coalitions have been formed for the purpose 
of maintaining status quo. Businessmen form conglomerates 
to control a market, senior politicians band together to 
vote down controversial bills, and popular children form 
cliques which serve to exclude less popular children from 
various social activities. The common use of phrases 
such as "the rich get richer, while the poor become poorer" 
and the power of the "bandwagon" effect reflect the lay-
person' s awareness of "conservative" coalitions. The fre-
quent prediction and reporting of "power inversion" 
effects (Cole, 1969) and lack of theories predicting "con-
servative" coalitions has led to criticism of coalition 
research as lacking external validity. 
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Commonly Used Coalition 
Research Paradigms 
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The criticism of the absence of external validity in 
current coalition research has been based on evaluation of 
the experimental methodologies used. Social scientists 
have primarily used two research paradigms to study coali-
tion behavior. Those two paradigms have been the "politi-
cal convention" and "parcheesi-board" methodologies. 
The political convention paradigm involved the as-
signment of different voting strength to subjects. The 
A > B > C, A < (B + C) resource situation would be repre-
sented by assigning subject A four votes, subject B three 
votes, and subject C two votes. Subjects involved in 
political convention studies were expected to role play 
politicians working the nomination of their own or a 
sympathetic "candidate" as the "party's choice for an up-
coming general election." In order to "win" the nomina-
tion, a hypothetical "candidate" must obtain a simple 
majority of the available votes. The payoff or reward for 
successful nomination efforts was depicted as some number 
of jobs provided for the subject's "constituents." 
For the parcheesi-board paradigm, subjects were as-
signed tokens of different advancement ability. For the 
A > B > C, A < (B + C) resource situation, subject A's 
token had a movement of four spaces per turn, subject B's 
token had a movement of three spaces per turn, and sub-
ject C's token had a movement of two spaces per turn. 
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Subjects were informed that they were playing a game in 
which the object was to reach the finish line on the game 
board first, either individually or as part of a coalition. 
At the beginning of a trial, each player placed his token 
on the starting line. For each turn, the experimenter 
threw a die and subjects advanced their tokens according 
to their respective movement ability times the number from 
the die throw. The reward or payoff for winning the game 
involved either points, imaginary money, or small amounts 
of real money. 
Unlike the political convention paradigm, which made 
coalition formation at the onset of a trial mandatory, 
the parcheesi-board paradigm allowed subjects to form 
coalitions during any turn of an experimental trial or 
to form no coalitions at all. The experimental procedure 
was such that, as in the case of political convention 
studies, any coalition would win. This was accomplished 
by having a coalition (represented by one token) advance 
its token a number of spaces equal to the sum of spaces 
moved by the individual coalition members prior to their 
union. If, for example, on turn one the experimenter threw 
a two on the die, subject A would advance eight spaces, 
subject B would advance six spaces, and subject C would 
advance four spaces. At the beginning of turn two, sub-
jects B and C form a coalition. The experimenter identi-
fies B's token as the coalition token and removes C's 
token from the board. The coalition token would then be 
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advanced l~ spaces, the total of B's and C's prior advance-
ment, from the point reached by subject B in the previous 
round. Such a procedure resulted in a situation where a 
coalition could form at any point during a trial and reach 
the finish line first. 
Central to both the political convention and 
parcheesi-board paradigms was the payoff distribution ne-
gotiations between coalition members. The common method 
was to have potential coalition members bargain for payoff 
distribution in some confidential fashion, i.e., notes, 
meeting in a room away from the excluded triad member, or 
lighted message boards. Frequently, experimenters fo-
cused upon the result of negotiations rather than the pro-
cess of negotiating. 
Restrictions Common to Current 
Research Paradigms 
Komarita and Meek (1978) have presented five restric-
tions common to current coalition research paradigms: 
1. Decision makers are individuals rather than 
groups of individuals (or committees) who 
must reach consensus before decisions are 
made. 
2. Decisions are based on a single issue (or 
criterion) rather than multiple issues as 
in political or diplomatic negotiations. 
3. The prize is constant (the same) for all 
'winning' coalitions. 
4. All decision makers are motivated to maxi-
mize on this criterion, and social motives 
such as guilt, sympathy, altruism, and so 
forth, play a negligible role in the coali-
tion process. 
5. There is perfect information among the de-
cision makers regarding the weights (re-
sources, power, votes, etc.) of each of the 
other decision makers and how these weights 
are combined to determine the outcome 
(p. 393). 
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This author believes that the effect of the aforementioned 
paradigmatic restrictions has severely limited the gener-
ality of present coalition research findings to coalition 
behavior that occurred in "real life" situations. 
Lack of Research Involving Experience 
and Uncertainty Variables 
In the author's opinion, two variables commonly found 
in real life coalition situations have been underrepre-
sented in the present body of coalition formation research. 
The first variable, continuity, involves the interdependent 
nature of coalition agreements and behaviors of coalition 
members working toward their goal. Under the major coali-
tion research paradigms, coalition formation has typically 
been perceived as discrete behavior. Experimental coali-
tion trials were usually designed to be independent of one 
another and effectively terminated once a coalition agree-
ment had been reached. 
A small body of research has been conducted investi-
gating the effect of experience on coalition formation 
(Chertkoff, 1966; Chertkoff & Esser, 1977; Levinsohn, 
1976; Vinacke, 1969). The general conclusion of the 
studies was that the strongest triad member became more 
likely to be included in winning coalitions and meet his 
or her payoff expectations when successive experimental 
trials were presented as interdependent. 
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The second variable which has received little system-
atic attention in coalition research has been the influence 
of uncertainty on coalition formation. A fraction of coa-
lition research has attempted to incorporate the real life 
variable of uncertainty in coalition research (Ashour, 
1973; Barnett, 1972; Caldwell, 1971; Chertkoff, 1966; 
Folkes & Weiner, 1977; Simpson & Punwani, 1975; Wahba, 
1972a, 1972b, 1972c; Wilke, Heertens, & Steur, 1973). 
With the exception of the Wilke et al. (1973) study, 
the results of a coalition research involving an uncer-
tainty variable reported a "strength is strength" effect. 
When experimental conditions were such that the probabil-
ity of success for any coalition was less than one and 
greater than zero, there was a significant preference 
shown toward having the strongest individual as a coali-
tion partner by the two weaker triad members. Review of 
the current literature which dealt with uncertainty under-
covered two drawbacks which limited the generality of 
results. 
Critique of Available Coalition Re-
search Involving Uncertainty 
Variables 
One drawback was the definition of uncertainty as a 
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unidimensional concept. Each of the available studies 
defined uncertainty as the probability an existing coali-
tion has of obtaining its goal. At present there has 
been no systematic research effort made to investigate 
the effects multivariate forms of uncertainty could have 
on coalition behavior. Realistically, individuals who 
find themselves in potential coalition situations often 
lack full information in several areas. Examples of real 
life uncertainty factors include: The exact distribution 
of resources in the situation, the motives of potential 
opponents or coalition partners, and subsequent behaviors 
of opponents and coalition partner(s) as they work toward 
their goal. It is the absence of knowledge in such areas 
which gives real life coalition formation an aspect of 
multidimensional uncertainty. 
A second drawback present in current uncertainty 
coalition research was the diversity in the experimental 
manipulations designed to produce uncertainty. Ashour 
(1973) used a dice game in which the experimenter threw a 
pair of dice five times for the coalition and five times 
for the excluded individual. The sums of the dice throws 
were multiplied by the respective weights of the coali-
tion and the excluded individual. The individual or coa-
lition that possessed the highest total was declared the 
winner. 
Caldwell (1971) used the parcheesi-board paradigm; 
the variable of uncertainty was achieved by deletion of 
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the rule which permitted the coalition a "free" move 
equal to the sum of its members' prior advancement. If 
an individual had developed a substantial lead prior to 
the formation of an opposing coalition, that person could 
still reach the finish line first. 
Chertkoff (1966) modified the political convention 
paradigm so that information on each candidate's chance 
of future success was included as a variable. The experi-
menter determined the success or failure of the coalition 
randomly drawing from a set of "win" or "lose" slips which 
were proportional to the probability of success given to 
the particular coalition. If coalition AB had a 70 per-
cent chance of success, then the experimenter drew from 
a set of 10 slips containing seven win and three lose 
messages. 
A deck of playing cards served as the randomizing 
element in Wahba's (1972a, 1972b, 1972c) coalition re-
search. The coalition and individual played a card game 
in which the object was to obtain the majority of 26 avail-
able "tricks." The coalition members alternately drew 
from a standard deck of 52 playing cards. The values of 
the cards were multiplied by the weights possessed by the 
coalition and third individual. A trick was won by the 
party with the highest total for that turn. 
Wilke et al. (1973) used dice throwing to introduce 
the element of uncertainty into a parcheesi-board para-
digm. A die was thrown to determine if a party was 
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permitted to advance during a turn, then, if permitted, 
thrown again to determine the distance of advancement. 
Parties advanced the number spaces indicated through mul-
tiplying their assigned weights by the number that appeared 
on the die thrown. 
Barnett (1972) and Folkes and Weiner (1977) provided 
no information on the procedures used to incorporate an 
(outcome) uncertainty as an independent variable in coali-
tion research. Simpson and Punwani (1975) only mentioned 
that dice were used as the randomizing method. 
Closing Comments 
Efforts to broaden the generality of coalition lit-
erature, represented by research on the effects of con-
tinuity of coalitions and uncertainty variables, have 
been tempered by two factors. First, the small number of 
available studies in both areas limit the generalizations 
which can be made to uncontrolled field situations. Sec-
ond, the absence of a consistent operational definition 
for the uncertainty variable has made acquiring reliabil-
ity evidence difficult. It was the opinion of the author 
that the development of a coalition research paradigm 
which systematically incorporated the variables of contin-
uity and multidimensional uncertainty would be useful in 
improving the generality of future coalition literature. 
CHAPTER IV 
PURPOSE OF PRESENT STUDY 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate 
the effects of continuity of coalitions and multidimen-
sional uncertainty on coalition behavior. The methodology 
involved represented a departure from more traditional 
coalition research paradigms. The result desired from the 
study was development of a methodology that would extend 
the ability of coalition research to generalize to the 
complexity of real life coalition behavior. The present 
study was designed to incorporate five independent vari-
ables into a series of experimental coalition situations. 
The five independent variables were: (1) coalition nego-
tiations method, (2) selection of opponent, (3) initial re-
source distribution information, (4) coalition length, and 
(5) mutual cooperation payoff distribution. 
The independent variables were presented in a series 
of studies which ranged from conditions of high to low sub-
ject "uncertainty" in terms of resource information and 
outcome possibilities. After a study.had been conducted, 
chi-square analysis of the data determined the course of 
the research project. The experimental series was con-
structed so that rejection of the null hypothesis led to 
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studies which contained greater subject uncertainty. Re-
sults which failed to reject the null hypothesis led to 
a subsequent study which provided subjects with less un-
certainty. Greater detail on the sequence of studies has 
been presented in the Methods Section. 
Description of Present Study's Paradigm 
The basic research paradigm involved the use of a 
mixed-motive card game known as Cosmic Encounter. At the 
start of a game subjects were each given a set of five 
"bases," four cards, and 20 tokens. The object of the 
game was to obtain a total of five bases from other sub-
jects. Bases were represented by locations on the game-
board. The card sets consisted of three competitive or 
"attack" cards of differing numerical values and one co-
operative or "compromise" card. The tokens were used to 
increase the numerical value of a competitive effort and 
to indicate possession of a base gained from another 
subject. 
There were two ways to gain a base from another sub-
j ect--f irst, by playing a higher attack card than the one 
played by the defending subject. Tokens could be used 
to increase the value of an attack card. This is dis-
cussed in the following section on multiple resources. 
A second method of acquiring bases was through the mutual 
play of compromise cards. When two subjects played com-
promise cards during a game round they could agree to 
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exchange bases, thus both would acquire one of the five 
bases needed to win. The rules of the game permitted two 
or more subjects to win simultaneously through coopera-
tive play. 
The game was also permitted the formation of coali-
tions. The benefit of forming a coalition was that mem-
bers of the coalition pooled their token resources. This 
allowed both members of the coalition to have greater 
token value to add to any attack card either should play 
against the excluded subject. A precise discussion of 
the game mechanics has been presented in the Methods Sec-
tion. It should be noted that the research game setting 
contained five features which conceptually parallel "real 
life" coalition situations: 1) multiple resources, 
2) continuity of coalition behavior, 3) dyadic mixed-
motive interactions, 4) interdependence of game rounds, 
and 5) multiple payoffs. 
Multiple Resources 
The first feature, multiple resources, was reflected 
in the use of token values and attack card values to de-
termine initial strength. Subjects added the points as-
signed to their individual playing pieces or tokens to 
the number found on the "attack" card played. The weights 
given the subjects' tokens reflected the A > B > C, 
A < (B + C) resource distribution. As the game commenced 
the number of bases acquired also served as an indicator 
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of subject strength. Under those studies in which coali-
tions lasted a single game round (study three, three-C, 
and four-D) , the number of bases acquired by each subject 
became an important factor in determining the relative 
strength of the triad members. It was possible in some 
studies for subjects to be presented with a complex pic-
ture of known resources (token values and acquired bases) 
and unknown resources (relative attack card strength, with 
the attack values established by cards randomly distribu-
ted by the experimenter). Such a situation could lead to 
subjects' making coalition decisions at a level of complex-
ity not frequently present or permitted in currently re-
ported experiments. 
Continuity of Coalition Behavior 
The Continuity factor referred to the necessity of 
subjects to actively pursue their goals following the 
formation of a coalition. Subjects had to invest tokens 
and use the attack and compromise cards in efforts to de-
fend their own bases while they sought to acquire the 
bases of others. Subjects had to decide whether to form 
a coalition or seek to obtain their goals independently. 
Once a game was underway, possible decisions subjects had 
to make included whether to play an attack or compromise 
card. If an attack card was used, some attack value 
needed to be selected for play. In the case of a mutual 
compromise situation, the offensive and defensive players 
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needed to decide whether to agree to the payoff terms or 
lose tokens. In those studies involving single round coa-
litions, a subject had to choose to make coalition offers 
to, or accept coalition offers from, a previous opponent. 
The availability of complex decision problems was intended 
to create a situation which subjects could find interest-
ing and challenging. 
Dyadic Mixed-Motive Game Elements 
The third feature, that of dyadic mixed-motive game 
elements, added a dimension of uncertainty rarely found in 
coalition research. Through skillful and fortuitous play 
of attack and compromise cards, a subject could do well 
against the strongest of coalitions. In the same vein, 
coalitions could show a poor second to their opponent due 
to careless and stereotyped card play. With the inclu-
sion of mixed-motive elements, subjects were motivated to 
attend to the conditions of play and behaviors of each 
other. 
Interdependent Game Rounds 
The fourth feature of the research paradigm, interde-
pendent game rounds, involved the relation of consecutive 
game rounds. Simply stated, the results of one game round 
influenced the play of the next. During a game, subjects 
were likely to lose tokens and become weaker in the attacks 
they make. Conversely, the bases gained in previous game 
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rounds could effect the willingness of a subject to com-
promise or attack on following rounds. A subject's rela-
tive strength as determined by the numbers of bases 
acquired and current attack ability could alter his per-
ception of the desirability of forming or breaking a coa-
lition. The factor of resource attrition in the game 
reflected a similar relationship between goal-seeking ef-
forts and available resources found in natural situations. 
Multiple Payoffs 
The fifth and final feature of the present research 
paradigm was multiple payoffs. Three forms of payoff or 
reward were incorporated as part of the research design. 
The first type of payoff, acquired bases, resulted from 
subjects carrying out successful attacks or mutual com-
promises. The acquired bases represented a short-term 
cumulative payoff which served to determine the winner(s) 
of a single game. 
The second form of payoff involved the points associ-
ated with acquiring bases. Each base acquired either 
through attack or compromise efforts was worth 100 points. 
These points were distributed according to the manner in 
which a base was acquired. For successful attacks, single 
players received the full 100 points; coalitions divided 
the 100 points between themselves as per payoff distribu-
tion agreement. Successful mutual compromises led to the 
points being evenly divided between the offensive and 
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defensive players or between all members of the triad. 
The method of payoff distribution through mutual compro-
mise was presented to subjects during orientation to con-
ditions of play. As an added incentive to form coalitions, 
coalition members who succeeded in defending one of the 
member's bases were allowed to exchange bases and divide 
100 points according to their payoff agreement. The 
points gained by subjects were accumulated over the course 
of the entire research project. 
The third form of payoff used in the research design 
came in the form of monetary prizes awarded to the sub-
jects who possessed the three highest point totals. Al-
though the relationship between the three forms of payoffs 
was positive, it was possible for a subject to acquire the 
greatest number of bases throughout the project, yet fail 
to qualify for a cash prize. It was this condition and 
the subjects' informed awareness of it which encouraged 
careful considerations of the long-term effects of their 
game strategy. The subjects' ignorance of their relative 
standing in accumulated points during the studies may have 
contributed to a general sense of uncertainty during the 
game. It was concluded that the uncertainty of relative 
standing would be a diffuse variable and function in a 




Although the present study sought to move closer to 
a full understanding of naturally occurring coalition be-
havior, it was not intended to provide a fully realistic 
simulation of real life coalition situations in the lab-
oratory. Rather, the project sought to investigate the 
effects of variables thought to exist outside traditional 
laboratory studies, but previously under-investigated. 
This goal was to be accomplished through the use of a 
coalition research game situation intended to be highly 




The subjects for this study were 45 male college 
students recruited from introductory psychology courses 
taught during the 1981 Spring semester at a southwestern 
university. They were randomly selected from sign-up 
sheets distributed to introductory psychology sections. 
The subjects received extra credit points and had the 
opportunity to compete for three monetary prizes. For 
the initial study, the subjects were randomly assigned 
to 15 triadic groups. In the subsequent studies, the 
subjects were assigned to triadic groups in which no sub-
ject had prior experiences with either of the other two 
subjects. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus of the present research consisted of 
materials taken from a commercial card game known as "Cos-
mic Encounter." For the purposes of the experiment the 
following playing materials were used: 
1. Hexagons: Three planet systems, each with five 
bases and a central section used to hold tokens 
lost during play. 
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2. Tokens: Three sets of 20 colored tokens. The 
colors used were blue, green, and yellow. 
3. Discs: Three sets of four discs, colored to 
match the tokens. 
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4. The Deck: Twenty-one cards, including 18 "at-
tack" cards with numerical values of "20," "12," 
"10," 11 8," "6, 11 and "4 11 (three of each) and three 
"compromise cards" on which were written the 
statement: "COMPROMISE make deal or take con-
solation." 
5. Hyper-Space Cone: A cardboard playing piece 
used to indicate the offensive and defensive 
players during a turn. 
6. Token Value Cards: Cards indicating that each 
token possessed by a player has a numerical 
value of either two, three, or four points. 
Game Preparation 
Prior to the arrival of subjects a basic set up pro-
cedure was used. 
1. Construction of Gameboard: The control section 
was placed in the middle of the table. Planet 
system hexagons were placed, base side out, to 
alternate edges of the central section (see Fig-
ure 1). 
2. Assigning Seating Positions: The names of the 
subjects participating in a given game session 
were written on 3 x 5 cards. The cards were 
then placed face down, shuffled, and each one 
placed behind one of the planet system hexagons. 
The cards were then turned up and the subjects 
seated according to the results as they arrived 
at the laboratory. 
3. Assigning Disc and Token Colors: A blue, green, 
or yellow disc was taken, placed face down, and 
shuffled. The discs were distributed among the 
planet system hexagons and turned over, exposing 
the discs' colors. The three sets of 20 tokens 
were then distributed to the matching discs. 
4. Assignment of Token Values: The experimenter 















Planet Bases Token/& 
Value 
Tokens 
BL = Blue 
GR = Green 
YW = Yellow 
Card 
Figure 1. Initial Game Board Set-Up 
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statements: "Each token is worth 4 points," 
"Each token is worth 3 points," and "Each token 
is worth 2 points." The cards were shuffled 
face down and then distributed one to each of 
the planet system hexagons. The cards were 
then exposed and the values of the subjects' 
token assigned according to the results (see 
Figure 1). 
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5. Initial Distribution of Game Cards: For the ex-
periments actually conducted in the research 
project, each subject started a game with a hand 
of four cards. Each set of cards included three 
"Attack" cards with values of "20," "12," and 
11 8, 11 respectively, and one "Compromise" card 
(see Figure 2). 
6. Recording of Pre-Game Information: Prior to the 
arrival of subjects, the following information 
was recorded: Subjects' names, assigned token 
colors, assigned token values, and values of 
"Attack" cards. The information on coalition 
formation and payoff distribution was not col-
lected until after the subjects' arrival (see 
Appendix A) . 
Basic Game Procedure 
Each experimental game session was divided into two 
trials. In the first trial subjects were seated according 
to the results of the pre-game session assignment. Sub-
jects were given copies of the general game instructions 
to read (Appendix B). The experimenter would read the gen-
eral instructions aloud while the subjects followed along. 
During this orientation the experimenter demonstrated how 
the playing pieces were used and possible results of play. 
After presentation of the general instructions and 
dealing with any resulting questions, the experimenter 
would distribute copies of special instructions. The spe-
cial instructions indicated the combination of experimental 
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c CHALLENGE CARD 
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ROMISE 
MAKE A DEAL, OR 
TAKE CONSOLATION 
Figure 2. Subjects' Initial Card Set for Studies 
One and One-A 
variables to be used in a particular study (Appendix C). 
The experimenter read through the special instructions 
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and indicated how they effect game play. Subjects were 
allowed to keep copies of the general and special instruc-
tions during a game session to refer to in case of 
questions. 
Trial one of each game session was started by having 
subjects negotiate for coalitions and payoff shares. The 
experimenter determined which of the three subjects would 
make the first offer. This was done by shuffling three 
colored discs matching those of the subjects. One disc 
was selected and the subject's disc color that matched was 
allowed to open coalition negotiations with the subject 
of his choice. 
Depending upon the conditions presented in the spe-
cial instructions, the negotiations were carried out 
either verbally or through written messages. In the case 
of verbal negotiations, the subject making the offer 
would present his terms verbally in the presence of the 
third subject. For example, the "blue" subject might 
have said, "Green, let's form a coalition; I'll take 50 
points and you take 50 points for each base we take." 
The subject who was the target of the offer also responded 
verbally. Response options were: "Yes, I agree to your 
terms," "No, here's my counter offer .,"and "No, I 
do not want to form a coalition with you." Should the 
special instructions require that negotiations be written, 
the subjects were provided with forms designed for that 
purpose (Appendix D). 
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If the first subject was unable to form a coalition 
with the subject of his choice, then the resulting two 
discs were shuffled and the disc exposed determined which 
of the other two subjects was allowed to make a coalition. 
Should the second subject selected be unable to negotiate 
a coalition, then the third subject was allowed to make a 
coalition offer. In the case that all three subjects had 
been unable to establish a coalition, the three discs 
were used to start the process over again. Once a coali-
tion was formed, the experimenter recorded the terms of 
the coalition on the sections of the data sheet designed 
for that purpose (Appendix A) . 
After the negotiation and formation of a coalition, 
the experimenter started the first trial of a game ses-
sion by randomly selecting one of the subjects as the 
first offensive player. Once the trial was underway, the 
experimenter acted as referee and recorded details on a 
11 Game Round Data 11 sheet (Appendix E) . For the second 
trial, the token value distribution remained the same as 
it was in trial one. The second trial is played under the 
conditions presented in the special instructions for study 
one (Appendix C). Subjects were permitted to reopen coa-
lition negotiations after which the second trial was 
started. At the end of the second trial, the experimenter 
reported the cumulative scores of the subjects for the 
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game session. Each subject was informed of the time and 
location of his next game session appointment. Finally, 
the experimenter reemphasized the need for confidentiality 
on the part of the subjects. 
Independent Variables 
The specific instructions for each study presented 
the combination of the five independent variables in-
volved in that particular experiment. Described as "Spe-
cial Instructions for Study ••. ",those sheets described 
the versions of the independent variables subjects were 
playing under at the time. The five independent variables 
were labelled Resource Distribution, Communications, De-
fensive Player Selection, Coalition Length, and Ally's 
Compromise Involvement. Each variable had versions which 
either enhanced subject uncertainty or reduced it. 
Depending on the degree of initial uncertainty pre-
scribed by a study, the appropriate combination of 
uncertainty-enhancing and reducing variable definitions 
were presented. The combinations ranged from no use of 
uncertainty-enhancing variables (study one-A) to all five 
variables being defined in uncertainty-enhancing terms 
(study three). When variables were intended to serve 
uncertainty-enhancing functions, their descriptions were 
as follows: 
1. Resource Distribution: Players will receive a 
set of four cards consisting of three "Attack" 
cards and one "Compromise" card. The attack 
cards will be randomly distributed from a deck 
of cards which have a value range from 30 to 4 
{not used in present study). 
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2. Communications: Players will secretly negotiate 
for coalitions and payoff shares through the use 
of negotiation checklist sheets. 
3. Defensive Player Selection: As the offensive 
player, an individual turns over one of several 
discs; the player whose tokens match the disc 
color becomes the defensive player. 
4. Coalition Length: After each game round, coali-
tions can either be reconfirmed or new ones 
formed. 
5. Ally's Compromise Development: If the offensive 
and defensive players mutually play "Compromise" 
cards, the ally retrieves his token and is not 
involved in the outcome of the situation. 
When variables were introduced to reduce uncertainty, 
the following descriptions were given: 
1. Resource Distribution: All players receive an 
identical set of cards consisting of one compro-
mise card and three attack cards which have numer-
ical values of 20, 12, and 8, respectively. 
2. Communications: Players will openly and verbally 
negotiate for coalitions and payoff shares. 
3. Defensive Player Selection: As the offensive 
player, an individual selects the player who is 
not his coalition partner as the defensive player. 
4. Coalition Length: Once a coalition has been 
formed, it continues for the remainder of the 
game. 
5. Ally's Compromise Involvement: If the offensive 
and defensive players simultaneously play compro-
mise cards and agree to compromise, each player 
receives an outside base and 33 points. If no 
agreement is reached in one minute, all players 
lose three tokens. 
Control Procedures 
From an overview of previous coalition research and 
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evaluation of the current design, several potential con-
founding variables were identified and controlled for in 
the paradigm. At the beginning of a two-game experimental 
session, subjects were randomly assigned token colors, 
weights, and seating positions. The triadic groups were 
arranged so that no two subjects played against each other 
more than once. Each study contained a control condition 
in which subjects played a game under the conditions 
found in study one. Subjects played the first trial under 
the experimental conditions dictated by the study and one 
game under the conditions of study one, which became a 
control condition. The inclusion of study one game condi-
tions in every experiment conducted enabled a check on 
the influence of playing experience on coalition behavior. 
Subjects were not permitted to talk except as re-
quired by the experimental conditions in three areas: 
1) coalition negotiation, 2) defensive player indication, 
and 3) mutual compromise decisions. The experimenter 
informed subjects that communications outside of those 
aforementioned areas were forbidden. In the role of game 
referee, the experimenter enforced the rule and restricted 
communications during each session. In a related concern, 
subject communications outside of the experimental setting 
were strongly discouraged by the experimenter. Subjects 
were informed that dissemination of their point standings 
or other experimental details would result in their ex-
pulsion from the project and forfeiture of the opportunity 
to compete for the available monetary prizes. An addi-
tional control was provided through a post-experimental 
test (Appendix F). One function of the test was to 
serve as a manipulation check of the perception of token 
weights. Further discussion of the post-experimental 
test has been presented in the Data Analysis Section. 
Description of Research Strategy 
The research methodology involved the use of a set 
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of studies presented in a decision tree format (see Fig-
ure 3). At the conclusion of each study the first trial 
coalition data obtained from the 15 groups were subjected 
to chi-square goodness-of-fit analysis. The question 
asked at the conclusion of any study was: "Did the first 
trial coalitions reflect a systematic pattern of results?" 
The answer to that question determined the next step in 
the research sequence. Should a study produce data that 
indicated a systematic pattern of first trial coalitions? 
The subsequent study was one which contained more uncer-
tainty variables. If a study produced non-systematic re-
sults, then the following study contained fewer uncer-
tainty variables. The 45 subjects were reassigned to 
unique groups of 15 from one step in the decision tree to 
the next. Thus, all of the subjects were exposed to the 
same experimental throughout the research project. 
STUDY ONE 
Deliberate Defensive Player Select. 
No Closed Communications 
Preassigned Resources 
Pennanent Coalitions 
Ally Included in Compromise 
STUDY ONE-A STUDY TWO-B 
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Open Communications Yes ;7 Open Conmunications 
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Permanent Coalitions Permanent Coalitions 
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The potential experimental patterns consisted of 
three main study sequences. Each sequence began with 
study one. The first sequence was made up of studies one, 
two, and three (Figure 3). In study one, the single in-
itial element of subject uncertainty was the closed coa-
lition negotiations format. Through the use of written 
messages, individuals secretly negotiated for coalitions 
and payoff distribution terms. The subject excluded from 
a negotiation was uninformed as to the payoff distribu-
tion used by the bargaining individuals. At the start of 
each game, players received equivalent sets of attack 
cards and one compromise card. The players were informed 
of the initial equality of their card hands. Coalitions 
lasted an entire game. The coalition ally was involved in 
the outcome of mutual compromise situations for both of-
fensive and defensive players. 
In addition to the closed communications format, 
study two included the random assignment of attack cards. 
With the random assignment of attack cards, subjects were 
unaware of their exact competitive strength in relation 
to each other. The selection of opponent, coalition 
length, and coalition ally's involvement in mutual com-
promise situations were the same as the conditions of 
study one. 
Study three presented subjects with the greatest de-
gree of uncertainty to be found in any of the research 
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project's experiments. Coalition negotiations were closed. 
Attack cards were randomly assigned to subjects. The se-
lection of opponent for the offensive player was randomly 
determined. Coalitions had a mandatory length of a single 
game round. The coalition ally was not involved in the 
outcome of mutual compromise situations. 
The second sequence consisted of study one and 
one-A (Figure 3). If the results of study one reported 
a nonsystematic pattern of coalition formation, then 
study one-A was conducted. The results of study one-A 
determined whether the experimental sequence was termi-
nated or branched into sequence three. The experimental 
conditions in study one-A presented subjects with the 
lowest initial subject uncertainty to be found in any of 
the potential studies. All of the conditions present in 
study one were duplicated in study one-A, with the excep-
tion of communication mode. Communications between sub-
jects in study one-A were to be verbal, giving the 
potential coalition opponent full and open access to the 
coalition negoatiations and payoff distribution agreements. 
The third sequence was a set of five studies. This 
set was comprised of studies one, one-A, two-B, three-C, 
and four-D (Figure 3). The third experimental sequence 
represented a moderate pattern of uncertainty variable 
manipulations. This was in contrast to the increasingly 
uncertain game conditions of sequence one and the absence 
of initial uncertainty present in sequence two. For the 
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third experimental sequence to be conducted. an initial 
finding of nonsignificant coalition patterns for study 
one had to be followed by a consistent set of systematic 
coalition patterns. Studies two-B, three-C, and four-D 
each contain deliberate selection of opponent and closed 
communications. The three studies differed on their com-
binations of attack card distribution method, mandatory 
coalition length, and coalition ally's involvement in mu-
tual compromise outcomes. 
Study two-B randomly assigned attack card values to 
subjects. Coalitions lasted the entire game and the 
coalition ally shared in the outcome of any mutual com-
promise situation. Study three-C differed from study 
two-B in the mandatory coalition length. For study 
three-C new coalition agreements could be made after each 
game round. A game round consisted of each subject serv-
ing as an offensive player through a single cycle. After 
every game round the existing coalition could be con-
tinued or new agreements made between triad members. This 
condition permitted subjects to "defect" from a coalition 
to form a countercoalition with a previous opponent. 
The final study of the third sequence, four-D, was 
equivalent to study three-B with the exception of the 
coalition ally's involvement in mutual compromise out-
comes. Under study four-D the coalition ally did not 
share in the potential costs or rewards of a mutual com-
promise situation. With its random distribution of at-
tack card values, short mandatory coalition length, and 
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exclusion of coalition ally from mutual compromise out-
comes, study four-D presented subjects with the greatest 
number of dimensions of uncertainty in the third sequence. 
The three experimental sequences presented here repre-
sented relatively straightforward result patterns. 
After the completion of each study, the data were 
analyzed in reference to the question: "Did the results 
indicate nonrandom patterns of coalition formation?" The 
response to that question determined if the next step was 
to continue in a given experimental sequence, shift to an 
alternate line of studies, or conclude the research proj-
ect. The following material was intended to describe the 
contingencies associated with various statistical findings. 
Contingencies for Selection of 
Study Sequences 
The results of study one decided whether sequence 
one or two was pursued. Statistically significant find-
ings led to an initiation of sequence one. Random coali-
tion formation reported in study one shifted the direction 
of research to sequence two. Once sequence one was under-
way, any nonsignificant finding resulted in a shift from 
the study which reported the nonsignificant results to a 
parallel point in sequence three. For example, if data 
from study two presented random behavior, the subsequent 
experiment became study two-B. 
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The report of nonsignificant results for study one 
led to experimental sequence two. The decision made at 
the conclusion of study one-A was whether sequence three 
was initiated or the research project ended. Finding 
nonrandom coalition behavior under the conditions of study 
one-A resulted in the pursuit of sequence three. No fur-
ther experiments were conducted if the data of study one-A 
presented statistically nonsignificant results. 
Once experimental sequence three commenced, any non-
significant finding terminated the line of research. Each 
study that reported nonrandom coalition patterns led to 
the next experiment, ending with study four-D. The results 
of study f our-D decided which one of two possible research 
evaluation directions was taken. Should analysis of study 
four-D's data yield random results, the experiments were 
compared to available coalition theories in an effort to 
identify the factors that contributed to the absence of 
systematic coalition patterns. 
In the event that systematic coalition patterns were 
reported for study four-D, current coalition literature 
was to be examined in an attempt to identify the best 
fitting model. If no satisfactory coalition model could 
be located, then a model would be developed and proposed 
to deal with the present research. It should be noted 
that the two evaluative strategies were not mutually ex-
clusive. The research evaluation descriptions given here 
were intended to point out the different analytical ori-
entations suggested by the possible statistical outcomes. 
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Completion of any one of the three experimental se-
quences represented varied degrees of success in utiliz-
ing a multidimensional definition of uncertainty in 
coalition research to produce systematic behavior. The 
completion of sequence one represented the greatest de-
gree of success. Completion of sequence two reflected 
the least success. Sequence three and the remaining pos-
sible study combinations of the three research lines in-
dicated moderate success in the use of a multidimensional 
definition of uncertainty in coalition research. The 
number of studies that the present research project could 
have involved were two, three, four, or five. Each set 
of studies reflected how effectively different elements 
of uncertainty could be incorporated as part of coalition 
research while still producing systematic behavior. 
Conceptual Hypotheses 
Beginning with experimental sequence one {Figure 3), 
it was predicted that studies one and two would report 
B-C or revolutionary coalitions. Study three, with its 
high degree of multidimensional uncertainty, was pre-
dicted to produce A-B (conservative) or A-C (other) coa-
litions. Results from study one-A in sequence two were 
expected to indicate the formation of the revolutionary 
coalitions frequently reported in deterministic coali-
tion research. Under sequence three, predictions of 
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revolutionary coalition patterns were made for studies 
two-B and three-C. A conservative pattern of coalitions 
was predicted for study four-D. Although the chi-square 
goodness-of-fit test served as the sole form of analysis 
for initial data, the option existed for other statistic-
cal tests to be used as needed for clarification of sig-
nificant preliminary findings. 
CHAPTER VI 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Data on the coalition formation process were col-
lected in an effort to evaluate the effects of multidimen-
sional uncertainty. Measures of the coalition formation 
process consisted of information of the token weights of 
subjects involved in coalition negotiations, payoff dis-
tribution offers and responses, and the final pre-game 
agreement for each trial. This material was recorded on 
the negotiation form and data sheet (Appendixes A and D). 
For each game round, data were recorded identifying the 
offensive and defensive players, their respective token 
weights (including coalition ally) , the cards played, and 
the outcome of the round (Appendix E). 
Coalitions were categorized as either "revolutionary" 
(B-C), "conservative" (A-B), or "other" (A-C). At the com-
pletion of a study, the resultant coalition patterns were 
subjected to a chi-square goodness-of-fit test. With two 
degrees of freedom, the critical chi-square value required 
to reject the null hypothesis at the .05 level was 5.991. 
Due to time constraints and availability of subjects, 
the number of groups available for analysis was 15. Thus, 
the expected (null) frequency for each coalition category 
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was five groups per coalition type. A possible effect of 
the small number of groups was to bias the results of the 
following chi-square analyses toward a conservative 
direction. 
Analysis of the first trial coalition patterns for 
each study was conducted for two purposes. First, the re-
sults of first trial coalitions determined the subsequent 
step in the research project (Figure 3). Second, the num-
ber of studies with significant first-trial coalition pat-
terns would indicate the degree to which multidimensional 
uncertainty could be used in the research project. The 
more studies conducted, based on first-trial analysis, the 
more elements of uncertainty that have been successfully 
incorporated into the research setting. 
Second trial coalition patterns were also subjected 
to chi-square goodness-of-fit analysis. Due to the de-
pendent nature of second trial coalitions, the chi-square 
goodness-of-fit analyses for these second trial coalition 
patterns were intended to serve only a descriptive purpose. 
At each study's conclusion, the coalitions formed 
were assigned to groups which represented revolutionary, 
conservative, and other coalition formations. Once data 
had been collected for the 15 triadic groups, a chi-square 
analysis was conducted comparing the actual outcome with a 
uniform distribution (i.e., five coalitions in each cate-
gory) . This analysis was to discover any significant pat-
terns, and to determine whether they were revolutionary, 
conservative, or other. 
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Analysis which led to a significant chi-square value 
indicated a "yes" decision in the project experimental se-
quence (see Figure 3). The finding of any systematic coa-
lition patterns was considered sufficient justification 
for increasing the dimensions of uncertainty. 
Nonsignificant chi-square analysis results led to a 
"no" path being taken on the research contingency design 
(Figure 3). The decision to reduce dimensions of uncer-
tainty would be taken following data which showed no sys-
tematic preference for any of the three coalition 
formations. With two degrees of freedom available, the 
chi-square value that represented P < .05 was 5.991. Data 
analyses which reported chi-square values equal to, or 
greater than, the critical value of 5.991 led to rejection 
of the null hypothesis. 
Analysis of First-Trial Coalitions 
The chi-square value reported for the first trial 
coalitions of study one was .4. The chi-square value re-
ported by study one failed to reject the null hypothesis. 
As the experimental conditions of study one failed to pro-
duce systematic first trial coalition patterns, the subse-
quent study was study one-A. After completion of study 
one-A, the chi-square analysis of first trial coalitions 
produced a chi-square value of 1.2. The reported value 
reflected a slight tendency for "conservative" (A-B) coa-
litions to occur less frequently than "revolutionary" (B-C) 
or "other" (A-C) coalitions. Since the chi-square value 
was lower than the critical value, the research project 
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Analysis of Second-Trial Coalitions 
Analysis of the second trial coalitions for study 
one resulted in a chi-square value of 2.8. Study one's 
second trial coalition pattern reflected a slight, though 
nonsignificant, tendency for subjects to select "revolu-
tionary" (B-C) coalitions (Table I). The distribution of 
second trial coalitions in study one-A produced a chi-
square of .4. This value reflected an absence of any in-
dication of systematic coalition choices based on token 
weights. 
Analysis of Payoff Distribution 
Agreements 
The payoff distribution data were analyzed in much 
the same fashion as the coalition formation data. Pay-
off distribution agreements were divided into three cate-
gories. The first category, equity, consisted of those 
coalitions which chose to divide the 100 points gained 
per base 50-50. The second category, parity, included the 
coalitions which divided the 100 point payoff in a fashion 
proportional to the initial weights of the coalition mem-
bers. The third category, inverse parity, contained coa-
litions which agreed to distribute payoff in a manner 
inverse to the initial weights of the coalition allies. 
The results for each study were subjected to chi-
square analysis and evaluated actual outcomes to the ex-
pected (null) distribution of five coalitions under each 
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distribution format. The results were evaluated against 
a critical value of 5.991. The purpose of payoff distri-
bution analysis was to provide descriptive information on 
the norms found acceptable by coalition allies during the 
project. 
It could be argued that the decision to assign equal 
expected (null) frequencies to the three payoff categor-
ies could introduce a powerful conservative bias into 
the chi-square analyses. As presented, the expected (null) 
frequencies ignore the many potential non-equality-based 
payoff distributions which could have occurred in the 
course of the experiment. Omitting the possibility of 
100-0 payoff agreement, as it would not have been a valid 
"division" of points, there were potentially 98 non-
equality-based payoff distributions available for the 15 
groups' use. One method of calculating the expected (null) 
frequencies which reflected the numerous non-equality-based 
payoff agreements possible was to multiply the number of 
groups by the probability of each payoff division. 
Under this probabilistic method, an equality-based-
payoff distribution had a one in 99 or .01 chance of ran-
domly occurring. Both parity and inverse-parity-based 
payoff distributions had a 49 out of 100 or .49 chance of 
randomly occurring. Thus, using the correction formula 
mentioned above, the expected (null) frequencies for the 
parity, equality, and inverse parity categories would have 
been 7.35, .15, and 7.35, respectively. While this method 
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would have taken into account the f~ll range of possible 
payoff agreements, it presented two problems. One, use of 
this probabilistic method would have resulted in an ex-
pected (null) frequency of considerably less than five for 
a category. This would have resulted in a violation in 
the commonly accepted practice of having minimum expected 
(null) frequency of five observations per cell. Two, re-
view of coalition formation literature, did not support 
the probabilistic method payoff agreements. If anything, 
the available literature suggests a bias in favor of 
equality-based payoff agreements. This probabilistic 
model has been presented as an alternative to the more con-
servative method used in the evaluation of payoff agree-
ments reached during the experiment. 
In each experimental trial, a significant number of 
coalitions agreed to distribute payoff on the basis of 
equality (P=.05). The difference in token weights be-
tween coalition allies did not appear to have any system-
atic influence on the payoff distribution agreements 
reached by subjects involved in coalitions (Table II). 
Analysis of Post-Experimental Test 
After completion of the research project, subjects 
were recalled for a post-experimental questionnaire (Ap-
pendix F). The nine item questionnaire was designed to 
assess subjects' perceptions of the critical game ele-
ments of token weights, coalition configurations, and 
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payoff distributions. In addition to the general informa-
tion provided, the questionnaire served as a manipulation 
check for the research paradigm's ability to present per-
ceivably different coalition resource situations. The 
chi-square goodness-of-fit analyses presented in Table 
III were based on a sample of subjects who attended the 




Trial #1 Parit:t Eg:uality Inverse Parity 
Fo 2 13 0 
Fe 5 5 5 
x2 = 1. 8 + 12.8 + 5 = 19.6 
Trial #2 
Fo 2 11 2 
Fe 5 5 5 
x2 = 1. 8 + 7. ?. + 1. 8 = 10.8 
Study One-A 
Trial #1 
Fo 1 13 1 
Fe 5 5 5 
x2 = 3.2 + 12.8 + 3.2 = 19.2 
Trial #2 
Fo 3 11 1 
Fe 5 5 5 
x2 = . 8 7.2 + 3.2 = 11. 2 




Item ResEonse Alternatives x2 
NUinber A B c D Score 
1* 22 1 0 2 53.24 
88% 4% 8% 
2* 7 2 2 14 15.48 
28% 8% 8% 46% 
3* 15 2 0 8 21.88 
60% 8% 32% 
4** 12 4 9 3.92 
48% 16% 36% 
5** 13 5 7 4.16 
52% 20% 28% 
6** 11 5 9 2.24 
44% 20% 36% 
7* 2 1 12 10 14.84 
8% 4% 48% 40% 
8* 12 2 2 9 12.28 
48% 8% 8% 36% 
9* 2 11 1 11 14.52 
8% 44% 4% 44% 
*For items 1-3, 7-9: df = 3, P<.05 = 7.82. 
**For items 4-6: df = 2, P<.05 = 5. 991. These 
items had only three response alternatives. 
It should be noted that the frequencies reported in 
Table II are dependent. This dependency is due to the 
common experiences faced by the subjects. All subjects 
underwent the same experimental conditions. It is also 
important to mention that a review of the game session 
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outcomes found that all coalitions were successful in win-
ning the games played. Thus, the perceptions reported by 
the subjects may be dependent upon the common witnessing 
of victorious coalitions on the part of the respondents. 
The information obtained from the post-experimental test 
was presented in the forms of response percentages and 
chi-square goodness-of-fit values (Table III). 
Items one through three and seven through nine (Table 
III) were evaluated against the critical value 7.82 (df = 
3, a= .05). Items four, five, and six were evaluated 
against a critical value of 5.991 (df = 2, a = .05). 
Responses to Post-Experimental Test 
Item one read, "If you had the opportunity to select 
the token value you were to add to the attack card played, 
which one would you pick?" Four alternatives were avail-
able; choices "A," "B," and "C" represented the token val-
ues four, three, and two, respectively. Alternative "D" 
indicated a "doesn't matter" response to the question. 
The chi-square values reported for the four alternatives 
were: "A" (X2 = 39. 69), "B" (X2 = 4. 41), "C" (X2 = 6. 25), 
"D" (X2 = 2.89). The results indicated a strong prefer-
ence for the token value of four points, represented by 
alternative "A." There was also a strong tendency to 
avoid alternative "C," which was the choice of token 
value of two points. 
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Item two, "Which token value combination was most 
likely to be found in a coalition?" presented four re-
sponse possibilities. The alternatives were: "A. 4 and 
3," "B. 3 and 2, "C. 4 and 2," and "D ('all equally pos-
sible')." The chi-square values for item two were: "A" 
(X2 = • 09), "B" (x2 = 2. 89), "C" cx2 = 2. 89), and "D" 
(X2 = 9.61). The response pattern noted that a signifi-
cant number of subjects believed that all token value com-
binations had an equal probability of occurring. 
Item three, "Which of the following coalitions was 
most likely to win a game {take five bases)?" listed four 
possibilities: "A (4 and 3) ," "B (3 and 2) ," "C (4 and 
2) ,"and "D ('all were equally likely to win')." The re-
sults of response pattern analysis were: "A" (X2 = 12.25), 
"B" (2. 89), "C" {6. 25), and "D" (X2 = . 49). The reported 
chi-square values noted that subjects thought that the 
coalition of token values four and three was most likely 
to "win" a game. 
The responses to item four, "If your tokens had a 
value of two points each, which of the other two players 
would you have preferred as a coalition partner?" showed 
no significant response pattern. The alternatives for 
item four were: "A (the one whose tokens were worth four 
points each)," "B (the one whose tokens were worth three 
points each)," and "C (either choice would be equally 
good)." Respective chi-square values for alternatives 
"A," "B," and "C" were 1.62, 2.25, and .OS, respectively. 
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Analysis of responses to item five, "If your tokens 
had a value of three points each, which of the other two 
players would you have preferred as a coalition partner?" 
failed to reject the null hypothesis. The alternatives 
were: "A (the one whose tokens were worth four points 
each)," "B (the one whose tokens were worth two points 
each)," and "C (either choice would be equally good)." 
The reported chi-square values for alternatives "A," "B," 
and "en were 2.62, 1.33, and .21, respectively. 
Item six, "If your tokens had a value of four points 
each, which of the other two players would you have pre-
ferred as a coalition partner?" For response "A. (the 
one whose tokens were worth three points each)" the chi-
square value was .86. Response "B (the one whose tokens 
were worth two points each) " had a chi-square value of 
1.33. The "C" responses, "either choice would be equally 
good," had a chi-square value of .05. 
Items seven through nine were concerned with hypo-
thetical divisions of 100 payoff points between two players. 
The situations were varied according to the token values 
possessed by the players. Item seven read, "In a coali-
tion between players having token values of four and 
three, a fair division of the 100 payoff points would be": 
Alternatives were: "A. 4 gets 60; 3 gets 40." "B. 4 
gets 40; 3 gets 60." "C. 4 gets 50; 3 gets 50." "D. 
Whatever the players decide on." The overall chi-square 
value for responses to item seven rejected the null 
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hypothesis (X2 = 14.82, critical value for three degrees 
of freedom P .OS= 7.82). None of the individual response 
alternatives produced a chi-square value large enough in 
itself to account for the significant result. There was 
a tendency for students to indicate a preference for an 
equality-based payoff distribution. The chi-square val-
ues for response alternatives to item seven were: "A" 
(X2 = 2.89), "B" (X2 = 4.41), "C" (5.29), and "D 11 (2.2S). 
Item eight described a payoff distribution situation 
between subjects having token values of three and two. 
The choices for i tern eight were: 11 A. 3 gets SO; 2 gets 
50. 11 "B. 3 gets 60, 2 gets 40." "C. 3 gets 40; 2 gets 
6 0. 11 "D. Whatever the players decide on. 11 As in the 
case of item seven, the responses to item eight produced 
a significant overall chi-square value (X2 = 12.28, p~.05 
= 7.82). The results of item eight also duplicated those 
of item seven in that, while no individual response choice 
produced a significant chi-square value, there was a 
slight preference for an equality-based payoff distribu-
tion. This preference was reflected in the reported chi-
square values for item eight. The respective values 
were: "A 11 (X2 = 5.29), "B" (X2 = 2. 89), 11 C" (X2 = 2. 89), 
and "D" (X2 = l. 21). 
The payoff distribution situation in item nine in-
volved players possessing token values of four and two 
points, respectively. The payoff distribution choices 
presented to subjects were: 11 A. 4 gets 80, 2 gets 20." 
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"B. 4 gets 50; 2 gets 50." "C. 4 gets 40; 2 gets 60." 
"D. Whatever the players decide on." Consistent with the 
results of items seven and eight, item nine reported a 
significant overall chi-square value (X2 = 14.52), with-
out any single answer category being responsible for the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. 
reported for item nine were: "A" 
= 3.61), "C" (X2 = 4.41), and "D" 
The chi-square values 
(X2 = 2. 89), "B" (X2 
(x2 = 3.61). Unlike 
items seven and eight, the response pattern of item nine 
did not suggest as strong a preference for the equality-
based payoff distribution. 
Closing Comments on the Post-
Experimental Test 
In making closing comments of the results of the 
post-experimental test, four areas of game concern were 
considered: 1) personal token preference, 2) coalition 
dynamics, 3) coalition partner preference, and 4) payoff 
distribution preference. For item one, which covered the 
subjects' personal preference for an assigned token 
weight, there was a clear desire for being assigned the 
most "powerful" token weight. Items two and three pre-
sented two aspects of coalitions in the study: probabil-
ity of occurrence and utility or likelihood of success. 
Subjects indicated that while all coalition combinations 
had an equal probability of forming, the A-B coalition 
was perceived as the most likely to "win" the game. 
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Items four, five, and six presented situations in 
which the subjects' own token weight varied and required 
them to select between two hypothetical players on the 
basis of token weights they supposedly possessed. For 
those three items no systematic preference was reported 
in the selection of hypothetical coalition partners. One 
explanation suggested by these results was that subjects 
felt that other variables were important in the decision 
to form a coalition. 
The items seven, eight, and nine were concerned with 
one variable which could have had an impact on the coali-
tion partner preference decision, both in the actual game 
and the hypothetical test situations. The last three items 
of the post-experimental test involved the division of pay-
off between the three possible coalition combinations, A-B, 
B-C, and A-C, in the A > B > C, A < (B + C) setting. In 
the actual experimental and post-experimental test, these 
combinations were represented by token weight combinations 
of 4-3, 3-2, and 4-2, respectively. The results of the 
three items noted a substantial departure from the ex-
pected (null) frequencies of responses. However, no 
single form of payoff distribution (equality, parity, or 
inverse parity) was clearly indicated as being preferred 
by the respondents. The pattern of responses tentatively 
argue that respondents believed that both "equality" or 
50-50 divisions and "whatever players decided upon" dis-
tributions would be satisfactory. 
CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
The absence of systematic coalition patterns for 
studies one and one-A led to the termination of the re-
search project after the completion of experimental se-
quence two. The nonsignif icant findings for experimental 
sequence two represented a failure in the attempt to pro-
duce systematic coalition behavior under conditions of 
multidimensional uncertainty. Three models are offered 
below in an effort to explain the lack of systematic 
coalition preferences for studies one and one-A. After 
the presentation of each model, an evaluation is made as 
to how well the particular model could explain the re-
sults of the coalition distribution, payoff agreement, and 
post-experimental questionnaire analyses. The three ex-
planatory models presented to account for the experimental 
results are the "utter confusion" model, the "pure ra-
tionality" model, and the "distraction" model. 
The "Utter Confusion" Model 
The first model, which represents the null hypothesis, 
is the "utter confusion" model by Gamson (1964). The ut-
ter confusion explanation would hold that the experimental 
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manipulations were simply ineffective. According to this 
model, subjects were so baffled by the experimental condi-
tions that they based their formation of coalitions on 
some randomly constructed criteria. The idea that sub-
jects were confused and thus made nonsystematic coalition 
choices would account for the results of coalition pattern 
and payoff agreement analyses with equality being the 
"safe" choice. 
The utter confusion model does not explain the prefer-
ences stated for token weights, hypothetical winning coali-
tions, and coalition partners found in the post-
experimental questionnaire data. Analysis of the post-
experimen tal questionnaire indicated a "strength is 
strength" viewpoint on the part of subjects. Subjects 
indicated a preference for the hypothetical game situa-
tions that placed them in the strongest position available. 
The subjects reported the desire to be assigned the "A" 
weight in the A > B > C, A < (B + C) token resource dis-
tribution. In predicting the winner of a hypothetical 
game, the A-B coalition was selected as most likely to 
succeed. In those items which varied the subjects' own 
token weight and asked them to select the preferred 
coalition ally by token weight (items 4, 5, and 6), the 
person having the greater of the two token weights avail-
able was indicated. The following two models, "pure 
rationality" and "distraction" have been constructed by 
the author in an effort to provide viable alternative 
explanations for the data results. 
The "Pure Rationality" Model 
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The second model, "pure rationality," provides an 
argument completely contradictory to that given by the 
utter confusion model. Pure rationality would hold that 
subjects fully understood the experimental conditions pre-
sented during studies one and one-A. Given the A > B > c, 
A < (B + C) token weight distribution and the low levels 
of multidimensional uncertainty found in experimental se-
quence two, the pure rationality model would lead to two 
assumptions: 1) subjects believed that any coalition 
would be a winning coalition, and 2) since any coalition 
formed would win, token weights were not a critical fac-
tor in coalition formation. Subjects operating from a 
purely rational viewpoint would be satisfied with any coa-
lition, regardless of the token weights involved. Thus, 
as in the utter confusion model, all coalitions had an 
equal probability of occurring. The difference between 
the two explanations was that while utter confusion 
would hold that all coalitions had an equal probability 
of occurrence due to random decision processes, pure 
rationality would argue that the equal probability of 
coalition formations was based on the subject's percep-
tion that all coalitions had an equal probability of win-
ning. The pure rationality model handles the coalition 
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distribution results as well as providing a more complete 
explanation of payoff agreement results and responses to 
the payoff items on the post-experimental questionnaire. 
Under the assumptions of the model, each member of a coa-
lition contributes equally; therefore, any payoff should 
be distributed on the basis of equality. The purely 
rational model failed to explain the preferences indicated 
by subjects who responded to the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire. The assumptions of pure rationality would lead 
to the prediction that no preference for token weight, 
hypothetical winning coalitions, or coalition partner 
would have been reported. 
The "Distraction" Model 
The third model, "distraction," can be applied to 
all of the data reported in experimental sequence two. 
The distraction model would argue that the dynamics of 
the experimental game setting act to distract players from 
careful consideration of the token weight distribution 
variable. As mentioned at the conclusion of the introduc-
tion section, one of the goals of the research paradigm 
was to present an experimental task that subjects found 
interesting and challenging. The explanation drawn from 
the distraction model would be that subjects were so 
caught up and interested in playing the mixed-motive card 
game, that the formation of a coalition based on token 
weights was seen as preliminary to the experimental task. 
Since the importance of token weights was submerged by 
concerns of game playing strategy, the decisions to form 
coalitions could have been made without much considera-
tion as to the effect the token weights would have on 
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the game outcome. The distraction model could deal with 
the coalition patterns and the payoff agreements analyses. 
With the contribution of token weights de-emphasized by 
other aspects of the game, no coalition would be seen as 
having more utility than another. This belief would lead 
to the decision for coalitions to select equality as their 
payoff distribution mode. Unlike the utter confusion and 
pure rationality models, the distraction model may also 
explain the "strength" preferences reported from the 
post-experimental questionnaire data. The post-
experimental questionnaire represented an independent 
event in the course of the research project. It was con-
ducted approximately one week after the final trial was 
run. The items served to avoid the distraction effect by 
isolating the variable of token weight. When presented 
with only token weight as a coalition decision criteria, 
subjects showed a significant preference for "strength." 
These findings indicated that subjects were neither con-
fused concerning the influence of token weights on the 
game, nor did they take the rational view that all coali-
tions were equal. Subjects' recognition of the relative 
values of token weights and coalition formation through 
their responses to the questionnaire lends support to the 
distraction argument. Of the three models, it is the 
author's belief that the distraction explanation best 
accounts for the experimental results. 
Concluding Remarks 
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Though the distraction model could account for the 
nonsignificant coalition formation results, the explana-
tion still suggests that the findings were produced by 
an ineffective presentation of the experimental variable. 
While observations of subjects' behavior during the game 
trials rated a high level of interest and involvement in 
the study, the factor of token weights was ignored. For 
future research involving the use of a multidimensional 
definition of uncertainty, the author suggests that more 
emphasis be given to the importance of the initial re-
source distribution. 
The suggestion of future research raises a question 
that is difficult for an experiment that reports nonsig-
nificant results to address: "Should further research 
be conducted in this area?" Despite this research proj-
ect's failure to produce systematic coalition behavior 
under conditions of multidimensional uncertainty, it is the 
conclusion of this author that research in this area should 
continue. Given the paucity of research on coalition be-
havior under conditions of uncertainty, future research 
should search for information on the generality of tradi-
tional coalition theories to naturally occurring coalitions. 
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Player Identification and Token Value: 















Coalition Information: An alliance has been formed be-
tween (check one) : 
BLUE and GREEN 
GREEN and YELLOW 
YELLOW and BLUE 
Payoff Distribution (fill in color and points) : 
gets --- points per base acquired. 
gets --- points per base acquired. 
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GENERAL GAME INSTRUCTIONS 
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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY GAME RESEARCH 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
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OBJECT: The object of the game is to establish bases on 
other players' planets and accumulate payoff points. 
To win, a player must be the first to have five bases 
outside his own planet system. These bases may be on 
all five of one player's planets, or two may be on one 
player's planets and three on the other's, etc. It is 
possible for several players to each have a base on 
the same planet. Because of coalitions and deals, two 
or more players can win together. The payoff points 
(100 per base) are accumulated over games and used in 
awarding the monetary prizes given at the end of the 
research project. 
GAME PREPARATION: Before starting a game, the experi-
menter will distribute the game materials, determine 
the token values, and discuss the conditions of play. 
The players will then negotiate for coalitions and 
payoff points distribution. Once a coalition has 
been formed, determine which player begins first. 
GAME PROCEDURE: The player designated as the offensive 
player selects one of the other players as the defen-
sive player according to the instructions given at 
the game preparation stage, by pointing the cone-
shaped playing piece at one of the planets in the 
defensive player's system. This is how the offen-
sive player indicates where he intends to establish 
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a base. The offensive player places one of his tokens 
on the oval-shaped section of the cone. The defen-
sive player places one of his tokens on the designated 
planet base. The third player places one of his to-
kens alongside the token of the player he has formed 
a coalition with. Once all the tokens have been 
placed, the offensive and defensive players each play 
face down a card from their hands. The cards are then 
turned over and the outcome of the game round deter-
mined. Once the outcome has been determined, the 
players return the played cards to their hands (see 
"Consolation" for exception) and play continues to 
the left of the previous offensive player. 
OUTCOMES OF PLAY: When the selected cards are turned 
over, one of three outcomes is possible. 
1. ATTACK-ATTACK: If both players used "Attack" 
cards, then the offensive and defensive players 
add the value of their tokens (and that of any 
ally's) to the number on the Attack card played. 
The player with the highest total wins. In case 
of a tie, the defending player wins. 
2. COMPROMISE-COMPROMISE: If both players used 
"Compromise" cards, then the offensive and defen-
sive players have one minute to decide if they 
will exchange bases and accept a predetermined 
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payoff point distribution. Should the players 
fail to agree in one minute, they each lose three 
tokens. (Refer to the Special Instructions Sheet 
for details on the predetermined payoff point 
distribution and involvement of the third player 
ally in the outcome.) 
3. ATTACK-COMPROMISE: If one player selects an 
Attack card and the other selects a Compromise 
card, the player using the Attack card automati-
cally wins the game round. However, since one 
player was willing to compromise and had been 
exploited, he receives "consolation" in that the 
Attack card used by the winning player is re-
placed by one of half its value. 
Winning offensive players (and any ally) place their 
tokens on the designated planet (establishing a base) 
and divide the 100 payoff points according to negoti-
ated agreements. 
Winning defensive players have simply protected one of 
their home bases and retain the used token for future 
use. Winning defensive players with an ally exchange 
bases with the ally (each thus establishing an out-
side base) and divide 100 payoff points according to 
the negotiated point distribution made at the start 
of the game. 
Losing players (and any ally) discard their tokens 
used in the game round into the central section 
of the playing area. 
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NOTE: Players are asked not to discuss the game outside 
the research area or to tell other players of their cumu-
lative game score. 
APPENDIX C 
EXAMPLE OF SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS 
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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR STUDY ONE 
1. RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION: All players receive an identi-
cal set of cards consisting of one "Compromise" card 
and three "Attack" cards which have numerical values 
of "20," "12," and "8," respectively. 
2. COMMUNICATIONS: Players will secretly negotiate for 
coalitions and payoff shares through the use of nego-
tiation checklist sheets. 
3. DEFENSIVE PLAYER SELECTION: As the offensive player, 
an individual selects the player who is not his coali-
tion partner as the defensive player. 
4. COALITION LENGTH: Once a coalition has been formed, 
it continues for the remainder of the game. 
5. ALLY'S COMPROMISE INVOLVEMENT: If the offensive and 
defensive players simultaneously play "Compromise" 
cards and agree to compromise, each player receives 
an outside base and 33 points. If no agreement is 
reached in one minute, all players lose three tokens 
of their choice. 
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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR STUDY ONE-A 
1. RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION: All players receive an identi-
cal set of cards consisting of one "Compromise" card 
and three "Attack" cards which have numerical values 
of "20," "12," and "8,", respectively. 
2. COMMUNICATIONS: Players will openly and verbally ne-
gotiate for coalitions and payoff shares. 
3. DEFENSIVE PLAYER SELECTION: As the offensive player, 
an individual selects the player who is not his coali-
tion partner as the defensive player. 
4. COALITION LENGTH: Once a coalition has been formed, 
it continues for the remainder of the game. 
5. ALLY'S COMPROMISE INVOLVEMENT: If the offensive and 
defensive players simultaneously play a "Compromise" 
card and agree to compromise, each player receives 
an outside base and 33 points. If no agreement is 
reached in one minute, all players lose three tokens 




Page: ____ _ 
Date: 
Time: 
NEGOTIATION FORM FOR COALITION 




Use token color to identify yourself and other players. 
FROM: TO: 
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YOU TAKE POINTS. I'LL TAKE POINTS. = 100 POINTS. 
Response: 
YES, I agree to these terms. 
Consider my offer (see below). 
NO, I do not wish to form a coalition with you. 
FROM: TO: --------- --------~ 
YOU TAKE POINTS. I'LL TAKE 
Response: 
YES, I agree to these terms. 
Consider my offer (see below). 
POINTS. = 100 POINTS. 
NO, I do not wish to form a coalition with you. 
FROM: TO: --------- ---------
YOU TAKE PO INT S. I'LL TAKE 
Response: 
YES, I agree to these terms. 
Consider my offer (see below) 
POINTS. = 100 POINTS. 




YOU TAKE POINTS. I'LL TAKE POINTS. = 100 POINTS. 
Response: 
YES, I agree to these terms. 
Consider my offer (see below). 
NO, I do not wish to form a coalition with you. 
FROM: TO: 
~~~~~~~~- ~~~~~~~~~~ 
YOU TAKE POINTS. I'LL TAKE 
Response: 
YES, I agree to these terms. 
Consider my offer (see next page) . 
POINTS. = 100 POINTS. 
NO, I do not wish to form a coalition with you. 
APPENDIX E 
GAME ROUND DATA SHEET 
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Game Round Data 
Round # ---
OFFENSIVE PLAYER DEFENSIVE PLAYER ------- ------
Cards Played: 
OFFENSIVE PLAYER (check one}: 
ATTACK: Add number on card 
Ally's) token value(s) 
attack strength. 
Compromise. 
DEFENSIVE PLAYER (check one) : 
ATTACK: Add number on card 
Ally's) token value(s) 
attack strength. 
Compromise. 
Outcome of Play (check one) : 
to Offensive (and 
This equals total 
to Defensive (and 
This equals total 
OFFENSIVE PLAYER WINS: gains 1 base and points. 
-- Offensive ally (if any) gains 1 base and = points. 
DEFENSIVE PLAYER WINS: protects base. If allied 
with another player exchanges bases with ally and re-
ceives points. Ally also gains 1 base and 
points. 
CONSOLATION: Attack card 
(Round down if necessary.) 
MUTUAL COMPROMISE (check one) 
is reduced to 
Agreement made: Involved players each gain 1 base 
and points. 
No agreement made: Involved players each lose 3 
tokens. 
Current Status 
BLUE has outside bases and __ total points. 
GREEN has __ outside bases and __ total points. 







1. If you had the opportunity to select the token value 
you were to add to the attack card played, which one 




D. Doesn't matter 
2. Which token value combination was most likely to be 
found in a coalition? 
A. 4 & 3 
B. 3 & 2 
c. 4 & 2 
D. All equally possible 
3. Which of the following coalitions was most likely to 
win a game (take five bases)? 
A. 4 & 3 
B. 3 & 2 
c. 4 & 2 
D. All were equally likely to win. 
4. If your tokens had a value of two points each, which 
of the other two players would you have preferred as 
a coalition partner? 
A. The one whose tokens were worth four points 
each. 
B. The one whose tokens were worth three points 
each. 
C. Either choice would be equally good. 
5. If your tokens had a value of three points each, which 
of the other two players would you have preferred as 
a coalition partner? 
A. The one whose tokens were worth four points 
each. 
B. The one whose tokens were worth two points 
each. 
c. Either choice would be equally good. 
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POST-EXPERIMENTAL TEST (Cont.) 
6. If your tokens had a value of four points each, which 
of the other two players would you have pref erred as 
a coalition partner? 
A. The one whose tokens were worth three points 
each. 
B. The one whose tokens were worth two points 
each. 
C. Either choice would be equally good. 
7. In a coalition between players having token values 
of four and three, a fair division of the 100 payoff 
points would be: 
A. 4 gets 60; 3 gets 40 
B. 4 gets 40; 3 gets 60 
C. 4 gets 50; 3 gets 50 
D. Whatever the players decide on 
8. In a coalition between players having token values 
of 3 and 2, a fair division of the 100 payoff points 
would be: 
A. 3 gets 50; 2 gets 50 
B. 3 gets 60; 2 gets 40 
C. 3 gets 40; 2 gets 60 
D. Whatever the players decide on 
9. In a coalition between players having token values 
of 4 and 2, a fair division of the 100 payoff points 
would be: 
A. 4 gets 80; 2 gets 20 
B. 4 gets 50; 2 gets 50 
C. 4 gets 40; 2 gets 60 
D. Whatever the players decide on 
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